Debaltseve. Expert Opinion

So, despite previously sustained losses and in connection with the premiere of the play "Путин начинает и выигрывает" (Putin Starts and Wins) on the stages in Minsk, the "vatnik" command nevertheless decided to "дожать" (squeeze) Debaltseve and ultimately report to the bosses in the Kremlin that everything is on track, allowing them to indulge in Melpomene...

All the more so, since this time, instead of the rabble of "psychos" and local short-sighted "miners", they sent fully trained and experienced "war dogs" from the very Pakhomya... from the ranks of the "army of the future", steeped in the principle of contract recruitment...

In addition, factors facilitating the next "breakthrough for encirclement" by "vatnik" units were:

- The deliberate refusal of the Ukrainian command to introduce any significant tactical reserves into the battle for the Debaltseve salient... A decision that, while tactically heavy, is highly justified from an operational-strategic point of view.

- The inability of the forces and means concentrated on the salient, after previous fierce battles, to hold the flanking positions of the salient due to a significant decrease in their combat effectiveness. Simply because they too had sustained quite noticeable losses in these battles. 

In this regard, the problem was not simply the organisation and conduct of counter-attacks against the wedged-in orc bands, but simply - holding one's own lines. Restoring the combat effectiveness of the grouping on the salient was very difficult due to a number of reasons and was carried out very slowly and unsatisfactorily. The main reason was the permanently increasing fire impact of the enemy not only on the forward positions of the troops and their battle formations, but also on the communications and command posts of the grouping on the salient.

- The continuing chaos in the interaction and control of the forces and means that were on the salient and represented a de facto heterogeneous grouping of the most diverse units. From linear tactical groups of the AFU, to volunteer formations with "virtual management via Facebook" from the National Guard, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, etc. They all continued to pull in their own direction. In individual cases, steady and covert control of units by higher command instances was lost. 

In fact, interaction was organised at the platoon-company level through personal contacts of commanders of the corresponding level; for levels above that, one could speak exclusively only in individual cases. Control, guidance, and adjustment of supporting artillery fire were also not always stable and in most cases were carried out with varying degrees of delay. 

- In addition, after the previous battles, the "vatniks" received very significant reinforcements and managed to carry out a considerable strengthening of their forces and means precisely on the flanking sections of the salient. Moreover, they did this very quickly, covertly, and successfully due to the de facto absence of any impact from the Ukrainian troops. The delivery of individual fire strikes by Ukrainian artillery on the concentration points and deployment lines of the "vatnik" hordes was more episodic than regular and could not significantly hinder the "vatnik" command in carrying out the complex of preparatory measures for the next series of attacks on the salient.

- Despite previously sustained losses, individual "vatnik" units managed not only to reach very convenient lines for further advance but also to hold them. All the more so, since Ukrainian units did not even attempt to counter-attack them, with rare exceptions. Consequently, in many cases, the "vatniks" obtained excellent starting lines for organising and conducting further attacks. 

- And finally, the impossibility for the Ukrainian command to carry out any significant covert regrouping of forces and means, as well as the transfer of reserves to reinforce units concentrated on the salient, due to the transfer of the "war" de facto to the internet. Where hordes of volunteers, "commanders of volunteer formations", advisers and assistants to security ministers, and other "concerned citizens" simply tracked online any steps and decisions of the Ukrainian command. Moreover, all these categories of citizens attempted and continue to attempt to control units through "public pressure" on the military command. 

It was simply impossible to organise and carry out any sane, let alone covert, preparation for a counter-attack under the conditions of this informational bacchanalia.

- In addition, it must be acknowledged that the moral and psychological state of the personnel of a number of units, which had been subjected to intense enemy fire for many days without receiving any significant reinforcement, left much to be desired. During the battles, alongside examples of high professionalism, courage, and heroism of the majority of the unit personnel, there were also cases of unmotivated abandonment of positions, withdrawal without orders, leaving combat vehicles and weapons to the enemy in working condition, or their deliberate and intentional destruction due to an unwillingness to participate in the fighting.

HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT EVEN UNDER SUCH FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS FOR THEMSELVES, THE ENEMY MANAGED TO ACHIEVE ONLY PARTIAL SUCCESS.

Events unfolded as follows.

1. Concentrating an assault tactical group (at least 2 BTGs) reinforced by artillery east of the Nizhnelozove - Novohryhorivka road and south of Sanzharykove, the "vatniks", taking into account "mistakes of the past", did not immediately charge head-on at the Ukrainian troops' positions, deciding to act more cunningly...

First, using the gaps between the defensive nodes of Ukrainian units (which were holding defence here in very sparse battle formations) and the sharply undulating terrain, a number of enemy reconnaissance groups, without entering into direct fire contact with Ukrainian units, covertly reached Nizhnelozove and the Debaltseve - Artemivsk road in the area of the Logvinove settlement.

After that, using the factor of surprise, they unexpectedly attacked the Ukrainian units occupying positions in this sector. Both from the rear and from the flanks. As a result, they managed to occupy these settlements, and the Ukrainian units had to fight their way out, partially to the north and partially retreating towards Novohryhorivka.

2. At the same time, the enemy began active operations in the Chornukhino area, trying to draw part of the Ukrainian grouping's forces and means away from the breakthrough point. In addition, at the same time, the "vatniks" began moving additional forces and means towards the Kalynivka area from the direction of Horlivka, trying to do so covertly (at least 1 BTG reached this sector), preparing to deliver another blow, this time from west to east, towards the "vatnik" units that had reached Logvinove.

3. It was precisely at this moment, as soon as it became known about the advance of the "vatnik" forward groups to the Artemivsk - Debaltseve road, while their numbers were still insignificant and they had very limited forces and means for organising a full defence, that they needed to be counter-attacked to push them back beyond the Nizhnelozove - Novohryhorivka road.

However, this did not happen, for a number of reasons.
- The Ukrainian command, it seems, simply did not have reliable information about the nature and size of the enemy forces that had broken through to the road.
- In addition, organising and conducting a counter-attack required one's own corresponding fresh reserve forces and means, which simply were not present in this sector (why? that is another question...). Confirmation of this was the 1.5 days required by the Ukrainian command to pull up and concentrate the corresponding tactical group from the north for this purpose.
- The units retreating from this sector, attacked both from the front and the rear, had de facto lost their combat effectiveness and therefore could not offer the enemy effective resistance, slowing its advance directly towards the road itself.

4. One does not have to be an outstanding commander of the type of "Semen Semenchko" to understand what will happen next. Correctly, the enemy mined the section of the road it occupied and withdrew directly into the village of Logvinove, entrenched there, and received reinforcement in the form of armoured vehicles that approached the settlement from the east.

However, they did not stop there. The main forces of the "vatnik" tactical group concentrated in this sector, even after being hit twice by Ukrainian artillery, managed to reach the commanding heights east of Logvinove and thus "propped up" their vanguard group in the settlement itself. In addition, it soon turned out that a "vatnik" armoured group and enemy infantry had also appeared in Nizhnelozove, which, it must be understood, were performing the role of flanking cover for the "barbarks" entrenched in Logvinove.
De facto, at this moment, all the "vatniks" had to do was strike from the Kalynivka direction towards Logvinove, and they could have proceeded directly to organising the outer and inner lines of encirclement. Of the Ukrainian units that could have prevented this, there were practically none in this sector. This did not happen in reality. Instead, the "vatniks" had already begun shouting from every corner "about the cauldron"... The fact is that the "vatnik" command was late in concentrating the Kalynivka tactical group. Due to its stretched position, it simply could not quickly go on the offensive at that moment. And introducing it into the battle in parts would have meant sharply increasing the probability of its defeat, since to reach Logvinove, it was still necessary to break through the positions of Ukrainian units defending east of Kalynivka.

Essentially, the "vatnik" commanders found themselves in the same situation as the Ukrainian command. Having missed the moment and lost time...

5. In the end, the Ukrainian assault group, stumbling along south of Luhanske, was concentrated and soon began breaking through to the south and south-east. This was accompanied by very intense artillery use against "vatnik" positions both in the Nizhnelozove area and directly in Logvinove.

It was precisely at this moment that the "vatnik" commanders realised that further holding of Logvinove itself with significant forces could "cost dearly" - the forward tactical group could simply be ground down by artillery, and the entire encirclement would end before it even began...
Therefore, along with the withdrawal from Logvinove of the main part of the group that had been holding it, the "vatniks" decided to organise several "distracting" strikes.
The results of one of them became widely known on YouTube today...
In addition, the "vatniks" significantly intensified pressure from the east on Debaltseve itself, striving to prevent a strike by Ukrainian units from the south towards Logvinove.

6. The unhurried and methodical manner of breaking through towards Debaltseve demonstrated by the Ukrainian northern tactical group contributed, in essence, to the suspension of the "vatnik" withdrawal to the east. And indeed, it could not expand the strike towards Logvinove to the left, being forced to delay in clearing the "vatniks" out of Nizhnelozove (or at least bypassing it with fighting), while frontal attacks on Logvinove itself led to nothing sensible (and could not, by definition, lead to anything).

De facto, the "vatniks" decided to entrench on an intermediate line east of Logvinove, firing through it and the road next to it from the heights. In addition, the main forces of the "vatnik" tactical group concentrated here decided, after a day, to "reach the road" again (it must be understood that the Kalynivka group was finishing its concentration at that moment). By yesterday evening, however, it still did not manage to launch a massed attack, limiting itself to several attempts to strike "in the seams", which were, however, covered by Ukrainian artillery...

As a result of this, just before the start of negotiations in Minsk, the main forces of both opposing tactical groups clashed east of Logvinove, and an engagement battle broke out with the massed use of armoured vehicles and artillery by both sides.
The battle ended de facto in a draw. But several points draw attention.
- The Ukrainian side gained the opportunity to push individual transport units towards Debaltseve via the Artemivsk road and sometimes even towards Novohryhorivka. However, all such endeavours are forced to be carried out under conditions of dense and massed enemy fire (the "vatniks" can fire accurately at the road all the way to the "cross" in Debaltseve).
- The "vatniks", although they withdrew from Logvinove and partially from Nizhnelozove, nevertheless have all the opportunities to maintain fire control over this narrow strip of territory. And all because, at one time, Ukrainian units withdrew from the heights east of Logvinove, from which a "wonderful" view opens over practically the entire Debaltseve salient.
- So far, attempts to advance south towards Debaltseve with any significant forces from Luhanske de facto end in massed, accurate "vatnik" fire on them. Just as attempts to occupy Logvinove itself. Which, for the most part, now exists in some "neutral" status (its occupation without clearing the "vatniks" from the heights east of it is simply meaningless).
- On top of everything else, the "vatniks" periodically "come down from the mountains" (meaning from the heights) and, in small mobile groups reinforced by armoured vehicles, carry out "raids" on both roads west of the heights. It is not always successful for the "vatniks", but several times they "went down into the valley" with results.

General situation.

- Further holding of positions in Debaltseve and south of it, as of today, can make sense exclusively from a foreign policy point of view - no more than that.
- One does not have to be a Clausewitz to understand a simple thing: the "vatniks" will continue to pound Debaltseve (no matter what it costs them). And its further holding makes sense only if you are ready and have the ability to methodically grind them down here. If, however, you are saving reserves and do not intend to spend them on these Debaltseve "readings", then it is necessary to blow the local railway junction to atoms and get out of this trap...
- I do not go into the domestic political significance of this battle, as it is already clear, but I will note - a repetition of the "Ilovaisk story" will have a very negative impact on this factor...
- War is the art of the possible; expanding the boundaries of one's own capabilities in war is the meaning of the art of the commander. If you act exclusively within the framework of the possible provided to you by the enemy - you will lose...
- And yes, any war that does not lead to peace - ends in defeat... © Konstantin Mashovets